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Historically, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has proven challenging for 
the member states on the periphery of the EU – the same member states that are currently 
experiencing high volumes of asylum seekers. This inability to address the needs of these member 
states was particularly highlighted in 2015, when Greece burst at the seams from asylum seekers 
arriving on their shores. To be sure, to date the CEAS has failed Greece, who was unprepared in 
infrastructure and procedure. With that in mind, and as Europe continues to share the ‘refugee 
burden’, stymieing migrant flows by any means, Greece represents an illuminating case for 
examining the competence and effect of this EU-wide asylum system. To that end, in Part I, this 
thesis completes a textual analysis and historical review of the Common European Asylum System 
and national policies in Greece. This analysis will address the root cause of the CEAS 
shortcomings and, with the addition of comparing asylum application data between 2008-2015 to 
directive and regulation transposition, how national policies transposed it as a result. Findings 
reveal CEAS’s shortcomings are rooted in its institutional design, creating formation issues. 
Additionally, finding reveal CEAS’s failure to consider diverse needs (cultural, geographic, and 
economic) in the current migration crisis has led to implementation challenges. Collectively, 
CEAS’s shortcomings have created a void that has left more than 60,000 refugees in Greece alone 
without basic reception conditions or reliable means to apply for asylum. In large part, this void 
involves a lack of CEAS information resources and information professionals capable of assisting 
asylum seekers with the paperwork and process required to apply for asylum. Across Europe, this 
void is being filled by a variety of public service and non-governmental organizations assisting 
this at-risk population throughout their entire entrance process (asylum application, refugee 
relocation, and immigrant integration/assimilation). In particular, throughout Northern and Central 
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Europe (i.e., Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, the UK, and France), public libraries are 
specifically filling this void by providing a variety of programming initiatives such as conversation 
based language learning, mentor sessions, increasing vernacular language materials, and assisting 
with asylum application information when able. 
As such, Part II of this thesis examines the role public libraries in Greece are currently 
playing in assisting refugees through any portion of the asylum process. As one of the largest 
reception countries in Europe, it was presumed Greece would offer similar services as those 
throughout Northern and Central Europe by utilizing their publically-funded libraries as safe 
public spaces for refugees. However, findings reveal that, unlike other parts of Europe, refugees 
do not regularly utilize the public library systems in Greece. I theorize this to be due to mainly 
three  reasons related to geographic distance from detention centers, cultural differences regarding 
the use of public libraries, and cultural differences regarding the library’s responsibility to these 
types of patrons.  
Additionally, due to mandates from the EU as to how aid money should be allocated, severe 
financial misappropriation is evident in Greece (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). The routine 
mishandling of funds exacerbates the resource shortage and creates a false front as to the level of 
assistance actually reaching asylum seekers. The incorrect presumption of enough aid resources 
followed by the revelation of this misappropriation no doubt discourages assistance in the future, 
perpetuating the stereotype that Greece is fiscally irresponsible. Financial misappropriation also 
consumes much-needed financial resources for other infrastructure projects in the major cities, 
while also creating an appearance that aid organizations are already filling resource voids since 
the money has been spent. This is one of many situations in which the lack of CEAS regulation 
generates a multitude of unforeseen and unintended consequences. This creates an environment in 
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which information resources are scarce and/or inaccessible, and in which libraries now operate to 
fill this void as a consequence of CEAS shortcomings.  
This thesis research is the first step in understanding the effects CEAS challenges and 
shortcomings have had on the functioning of information institutions and professions in Greece in 
particular, and what this means for the future of librarianship in Europe. The unique and 
unfortunate set of circumstances surrounding the current migration situation also provide 
opportunity to learn about the information seeking needs of the at-risk populations impacted by 
the environment created by CEAS shortcomings, and how to apply the lessons learned here to 



























To all my peers who have ever been asked,  
“so what are you going to do with that degree?” 
We do all of the things. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is the EU’s attempt at commonly held 
vision for asylum processing. While designed to provide parameters and guidance to those 
assisting asylum seekers, CEAS implementation has proven challenging especially for the member 
states on the periphery of the EU – the same member states that are currently experiencing high 
volumes of asylum seekers. The challenges around implementation along with the inability of the 
CEAS to address the needs of these member states was highlighted in 2015, when Greece began 
bursting at the seams from asylum seekers arriving on their shores. To be sure, the EU’s attempt 
at a common asylum system (the CEAS) has so far has failed Greece, who was unprepared in 
infrastructure and procedure due to lethal combination of financial misappropriation, a lack of 
transparency, and a stereotype assigned to the process of Greek governance as a result of past 
discretions.  
A glance at news reports throughout 2015 and 2016 reveals the unpreparedness and lack 
of solidarity plaguing many European Union member states on the periphery of the EU as a result 
of past CEAS shortcomings – most notably, those with struggling economies such as Greece 
(Lyman, 2015; Mackey, 2015; O’Grady, 2015; Siddique and Weaver, 2015; The Economist, 
2016). Greece most specifically suffered the consequence of a reactive approach to migration 
rather than a proactive one, realizing they did not possess adequate resources when asylum seekers 
were already on their doorstep. This reactive approach was a result of nearly ten years of CEAS 
negotiation that, due to complex negotiation and voting procedures in the EU institutions, did not 
provide Greece, a periphery country, asylum system processes until 2014 – hardly enough time to 
gather the appropriate resources to implement such procedures by the time asylum seekers began 
arriving on their shores. As a result, the EU and a multitude of aid organizations began pouring 
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money into the crisis management efforts in an attempt to provide some kind of shelter and food 
resources to the large quantity of asylum seekers stalled at Greek borders awaiting the lack-of-
resource-driven lengthy asylum process (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). 
As Europe continues to share the ‘refugee burden’ to relieve some of this economic and 
physical stress from Greece, and as xenophobic, racist trends continue to rise in tandem with an 
increase in terrorist attacks, the EU-wide asylum system must necessarily address the multicultural 
nature of the member states. This in theory could assist in combatting backlash, both on the 
member state and supranational level, by encouraging tolerance and acceptance of those deemed 
as ‘others’ and by increasing the likelihood that the different cultural values of member states are 
ingrained in the policies that impact their citizens. Without a comprehensive, well-formed system 
encompassing as many member states needs and scenarios as possible, ideologies clash between 
member state and supranational units, CEAS implementation at the national level decreases, and 
unpreparedness is likely to set in. This hurts those on the regional and local levels who often 
receive the brunt of the consequences – most specifically, the asylum seekers trapped in Greece 
without adequate food and shelter, most of which are at risk of trafficking, physical violence, and 
sexual assault.  The above mentioned factors open the door for a host of problems between member 
states and EU institutions; including, but not limited to culture clashes, intergovernmental strife, 
and a disregard for supranational policy, in general – internal discord that could ultimately decrease 
internal cohesiveness in the EU in a time when solidarity may be its saving grace.   
The Common European Asylum System endures the task of accommodating twenty-eight 
different sets of historical, cultural, and geographic concerns when it comes to regulation and 
directive transposition as well as ensuring implementation. As a result, member state and EU 
institution expectations are often not met in regards to regulation and directive transposition and 
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implementation. Scholars argue that a bolder approach is needed to overcome these issues of 
fragmentation and manage the refugee crisis effectively – to identify that this crisis is more than 
just “a crisis of numbers” but also an issue of cohesiveness (Turk, 2016). Upon examination of the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) – one of the EU’s primary declarations of their 
strategy for asylum processing – a noticeable disconnect exists between EU institutions and 
member states regarding directive and regulation transposition and interpretation. The letter of the 
law is not synonymous with the spirit of the law, specifically in the case of CEAS transposition 
and implementation in Greece. These shortcomings highlight an underlying governance issue 
within the system itself, creating and encouraging tension between the member states and 
supranational institution. This thesis argues that through geographic and economic inequalities, 
the CEAS becomes ineffective for Greece as a periphery and gatekeeper country – defined as the 
geographical boundary of the Schengen Zone.  
EU institutions modified the CEAS over the course of more than a decade (1994-2016), 
followed by Greece’s attempt to implement the CEAS within their own national asylum policy 
starting in the 1990s. In Part I, this thesis explores those modifications, known as phase I and phase 
II of the CEAS, to identify the historical context of EU asylum and migration efforts. Literature 
identifying its shortcomings from a theoretical perspective will set the stage for addressing the 
shortcomings and successes within the Common European Asylum System. By using a three-level 
method approach that explores the process and outcome of the strategy, implementation, and 
effect, I examine the CEAS and Greek national asylum and migration strategy throughout various 
phases and trajectories. The primary focus is on the Dublin II Regulation, Asylum Procedures 
Directive, and Receptions Conditions Directive, at the supranational and Greek national level. I 
utilize a comparative text-analysis and asylum application data from 2008-2015 in Greece and the 
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EU 28 – with some reference to older migration waves in the 1990s – to compare the written 
regulations and directives with the transposition and implementation outcome in Greece, 
highlighting the changes between phase I and phase II of the CEAS. This approach assists in 
determining the interdependence between the EU supranational institutions and its member states, 
and the delicate relationship between EU competencies and national (sovereign) competencies.  
I chose to examine Greece due to geography, culture, economy, relationship in and with 
the EU governing bodies, and central roles in this immigration crisis and previous ones. I also 
argue that the EU approaches adherence to the CEAS by using normative power since the law does 
not technically require the transposition of directives. This is because migration is not a 
supranational competence, meaning the member states must ultimately decide on migration law 
for their individual countries. Directives and regulations comprise the CEAS– directives meaning 
the European Court of Justice strongly suggest but do not enforce them; regulations meaning they 
are technically laws but do not go through the same legislative process as other policies. 
Findings reveal this strategy’s shortcomings are rooted in its institutional design. Its failure 
to address the diverse member state needs (cultural, geographic, and economic) of this crisis, 
creates implementation challenges. Collectively, these shortcomings have created a void that has 
left more than 60,000 refugees in Greece alone without basic reception conditions or reliable 
means to apply for asylum. In large part, this void involves a lack of information resources and 
information professionals capable of assisting these asylum seekers with the paperwork and 
process required to apply for asylum. Across Europe, this void is being filled by a variety of public 
service and non-governmental organizations assisting this at-risk population throughout their 
entire entrance process (asylum application, refugee relocation, and immigrant 
integration/assimilation). In libraries throughout Northern and Central Europe (i.e., Germany, 
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Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, the UK, and France), public libraries specifically are filling this 
void by providing a variety of programming initiatives such as conversation based language 
learning, mentor sessions, increasing vernacular language materials, and assisting with asylum 
application information when able. This, however, does not seem to be the case for Greece. 
As such, part II of this thesis examines the role public libraries in Greece play in assisting 
refugees through any portion of the asylum process. As one of the largest reception countries in 
Europe, it was presumed Greece would offer similar services to other member states such as 
Sweden, Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and the UK, by utilizing their publically-
funded libraries as safe public spaces for refugees (EBLIDA, 2017). Literature identifying these 
case studies, general information seeking behavior of at-risk populations, and library science 
theory on the role of libraries in a community will support the exploration of the role of libraries 
in the midst of strategy shortcomings that leave an information void to be filled and a member 
state struggling to implement strategies in an effective and efficient manner.  
To obtain a better sense of the level of interaction librarians in Greece may have had with 
these populations, I developed an anonymous survey in which I asked respondents whether or not 
they served asylum seeker, refugee, and/or migrant populations, what types of resources these 
patrons were looking for, how this potentially larger flow of patrons impacted their day-to-day 
activities and staffing structure, whether or not they partnered with religious or non-governmental 
organizations to assist these patrons, and if there were any major language barriers associated with 
their reference interviews. I disseminated this survey through email to contacts in managerial 
positions within the library system in Greece who are well-known and respected individuals in 
their Greek library community. The survey was then passed on through professional library 
listservs, distributed widely across the country to Greek librarians. The survey was additionally 
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posted on the social media accounts of these well-known Greek librarians. Due to the breadth of 
survey dissemination in addition to the successful models of asylum seeker, refugee, and migrant 
assistance in other European libraries, I expected some responses from the survey – especially with 
Greece as a reception country and having tens of thousands of asylum seekers enter Greece and 
remain in Athens (UNHCR, 2016).  
However, findings reveal that, unlike other parts of Europe, refugees do not regularly 
utilize the public library systems in Greece. I theorize this to be due to three (potentially more) 
reasons related to geographic distance from detention centers, cultural differences regarding the 
use of public libraries, and cultural differences regarding the library’s responsibility to these types 
of patrons. Additionally, due to mandates from the EU as to how aid money should be allocated, 
severe financial misappropriation is evident in Greece (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). The routine 
mishandling funds exacerbates the resource shortage and also creates a false front as to the level 
of assistance actually reaching asylum seekers. The incorrect presumption of enough aid resources 
followed by the revelation of this misappropriation no doubt discourages assistance in the future, 
perpetuating the stereotype that Greece is fiscally irresponsible. Financial misappropriation also 
consumes much-needed financial resources for other infrastructure projects in the major cities 
while creating an appearance that aid organizations are already filling resource voids since the 
money has been spent. This generates a multitude of unforeseen and unintended consequences, 
creating an environment in which information resources are scarce and/or inaccessible and in 
which libraries now operate to fill this void as a consequence of CEAS shortcomings.  
 With the EU projecting additional individuals flowing through Greece and other gatekeeper 
countries due the continued unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, the current asylum system 
cannot afford to be ineffective – both for the sake of the cohesiveness of the EU and for the asylum 
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seekers risking their lives to enter (EU Commission, 2015:48). UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees Filippo Grandi has warned of even broader consequences – of the EU “backtracking, 
losing its vision, values, and lessening its influence in the world” as a result of this migration crisis 
(Murray, 2016). As the EU relies heavily on normative power to execute its vision, in general, 
losing it via asylum would be detrimental. Identifying issues of both formation and implementation 
place this argument within the larger field of literature on the functionality of the EU, and whether 





















“The gap between the goals of national immigration policy… and 
the actual results of policies in this area (policy outcomes) is wide 
and growing wider” (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, 1994).  
 
Applying this to the CEAS as the EU’s asylum system, the above quote from 1994 is indicative of 
the lack of progression the EU had in relation to a functioning immigration and asylum system 
post-Soviet break-up. The gap has become much wider since, with the EU member states still 
divided on how to enact cohesive border control in 2017 (SchengenVisaInfo, 2017). Greece, a 
Schengen Zone member on the periphery of the European Union, is a landing point for 
Mediterranean migratory routes. Whether coming from the western borders of Turkey and landing 
on the various Aegean Islands or traveling by foot across the Greek-Turkish border, asylum 
seekers, primarily from the Middle East, utilize Greece as a gateway into Central and Northern 
Europe. Mass migration into the EU is not a new phenomenon, however, nor is the presence and 
gravity of Mediterranean migratory routes. Armed conflict, persecution, poverty, and 
unemployment in Central and Northern Africa, the Middle East, Caucasus, and Eastern Europe 
has driven asylum seekers into Europe for decades – albeit, in smaller droves than the recent 
“crisis”. Stephen Castles’ description from 2004 accurately describes the scenario in 2017 and 
prior, when he states, “Undocumented migration entry of asylum seekers and the formation of new 
ethnic communities all seem to be driven by forces which governments cannot control” (Castles, 
2004:205). While governments cannot control these forces, they can take steps to mitigate them – 
whether it be through proper processing and safety areas in the country of origin, or simply 
recognizing the role they play in the destabilization of the area. Whether due to the inability to 
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recognize the state of geopolitical affairs, its potential impact of migration in and out of Europe, 
or the Western world’s role, the flood of tens of thousands of asylum seekers was a shock to the 
EU’s and Greece’s asylum processing capabilities and infrastructure.  
To be sure, forced migration into the EU (and many others parts of the world) has occurred 
in large waves since the early 1990s and prior, post-Soviet dissolution. A proclaimed hub for 
freedom and democracy, Europe, like the U.S., is a beacon for many. To say that the EU should 
have anticipated the need for a more collaborative and established asylum process is bold; 
however, the destabilization of the surrounding areas (the Middle East, North and Central Africa, 
and the Caucasus) should have been an indication of an impending flood of asylum seekers. If 
history has taught us anything, religious persecution, war, famine, struggling economies, and lack 
of opportunity are all catalysts for migration – all of which are seen, whether in part or in total, in 
several geographic regions surrounding the EU. Presuming that EU law makers did not ignore 
these obvious signs, it is important to identify the other possible root causes of CEAS 
shortcomings, both in regard to the EU and countries in similar situations, and the implications it 
has had on smaller organizations within the country of entry who regularly deal with the fallout of 
these shortcomings.  
 
Addressing Asylum System Development Issues: A Water Tap or Wild River? 
The EU’s reactive rather than proactive approach seen in 2014-2016 placed it in a 
challenging position like many other developed countries face when bordering less developed 
areas fraught with any combination of war, climate change stress, poverty, and foreign 
intervention. As Castles has indicated, the US has been trying to halt illegal migration from Mexico 
for years. When they generated a reform act to make the hiring of illegal immigrants a federal 
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offence, they failed to implement employer consequences (similar to implementation issues in the 
EU). This resulted in employers hiring illegal immigrants for cheaper wages, thereby providing a 
market for illegal immigrants. In response, the Clinton administration increased security at the 
border (barbed fences, helicopters, searchlights, search dogs, etc.). However, there was no decline 
in illegal migration; in fact, there was a sharp increase – not only in arrivals, but also in missing 
persons and illegal smuggling (Castles, 2004). The root problem of illegal migration was not (and 
perhaps not able to be) addressed fully nor was their attempt at policy completely developed from 
start to finish. In sum, the US failed in policy implementation causing the problem to increase and 
tried to rectify by fencing off the border, which only resulted in a further increase in illegal 
migration.  
Similarly, the EU failed1 in CEAS implementation as well, resulting in ineffective border 
controls and asylum processing. The response to the gatekeepers’ management shortcomings (in 
our case, Greece) in 2015-2016 has been fence building across the migratory routes through the 
Balkans (Macedonia, Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria, to name a few). However, migration cannot 
be “turned on and off like a tap by appropriate policy settings”; or, in this case, fences (2004: 208). 
If we use the US example, and the four others Castles describes in which policies have achieved 
the opposite of their original agenda, we can expect that illegal migration will still continue; and, 
given the turmoil in the countries of origination (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan being amongst the 
largest), they will keep arriving on the shores of the EU; or, die trying. It would be prudent for the 
EU to address these situations when formulating asylum and immigration procedures; as Castles 
(2004) states, “it is necessary to analyse the migratory process as a long-term social process with 
																																																						
1	Using Castles’ definition of policy failure, arguing that the CEAS did not achieve its stated objectives 
(2004: 207).	
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its own dynamics” (2004: 207). Contributing to his suggestion that comparatively little has been 
done to address the root causes of forced migration, comparatively little has been done to address 
the stark differences in culture, geography, and economic situation between member states within 
the Common European Asylum System – the EU’s asylum ‘policy’2 (2004: 221). 
 
EU Governance Structure and Its Impact on CEAS Development 
Internal Dynamics and a History of Marginalization in Europe 
EU lawmakers throughout 2015 and later have been increasing efforts to process migrants 
in their countries of origin or neighboring countries; both to avoid migrants making a perilous trek 
across the Mediterranean and to weed out economic migrants more readily (i.e., the March 2016 
EU-Turkey deal). While this thesis does not address specific recommendations to fix the EU 
asylum system, it does suggest the need to examine the root cause of many migration policies. I 
argue these to be, in part, global and/or regional inequalities, driven by deep-rooted 
marginalization and the exclusion of foreigners within Greece and Europe by those in the driver’s 
seat of the Euro global “troika” (the European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and 
European Central Bank), as Heath Cabot calls it (Cabot, 2014: xi). Often insurmountable dilemmas 
are posed by these European bureaucrats, creating what Cabot describes as “tragedies” of asylum 
in Greece. While his research does not focus on the rise and cause of this deep-rooted 
marginalization within the European government, Cabot instead focuses on the impact of this 
bureaucracy on the ground-level aid and rights organizations and Greek citizens in the thick of the 
asylum “tragedies”, including the smaller sites where asylum judgement is carried out.  
																																																						
2 The CEAS is not considered a policy since migration and asylum policy is a member state competency. 
It is therefore a system that is regulated but not enforced like an EU policy. 
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In 2010, Greece had the fourth largest number of backlogged asylum cases in the world, 
according to the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2010). For EU and external audiences, this flood of asylum 
seekers was not only a concern of volume but also of 1.) Greece’s capacity to handle this volume 
and ensure adequate protection for asylum seekers and 2.) Greece’s ability to gate-keep the EU’s 
borders from perceived “alien threats” (Cabot, 2014: 4). The EU’s and international audience’s 
perception of this asylum “crisis” and “alien threats” accentuates stereotypes and “enacts forms of 
judgement by demarcating certain territories, persons, and moments as sites of potential danger” 
(Cabot 2014:5). Greece’s response to these pressures was an attempt to optimize and expedite 
asylum requests by prototyping credible asylum cases, thereby perpetuating a history of 
marginalization both in regards to Greece’s status in the EU and the exclusion of asylum seekers 
and refugees in Europe (Coutin, 2000:107; Cabot, 2014:5). 
As an example of this marginalization, the CEAS, at the heart of this discourse, favors non-
periphery countries, such as Central and Northern Europe, in that they neither have to spend the 
resources for gatekeeping, nor are they typically responsible for asylum processing; since, under 
the Dublin II regulation, asylum seekers are to be processed by the country of entry. The Dublin 
regulation was formed under the Irish council presidency, and thus is favorable in migration and 
asylum regulations for them as northern EU member states. According to Steve Peers, though, it 
did not do very much to shift the balance of immigration and asylum measures toward control by 
mid-2004 – furthering Castle’s statement that there was a shift away from border control (Peers, 
2004:244). Thus, the EU asylum system has been influenced and formed, in part, with what Castles 
calls ‘clientelist politics’, dominated by the wishes of the more powerful, influential lawmakers in 
the supranational institutions. The Dublin II regulation and by extension the CEAS are tools for 
the marginalization of Greece and foreigners alike.   
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When beginning to address migration in the late 1990’s-early 2000’s, European institutions 
struggled with direction and agreement on immigration and asylum measures. The June 2003 
European Council in Thessaloniki “seemed to represent a shift away from the emphasis on border 
control, towards more attention to integration of immigrants and cooperation with countries of 
origin” (Castles, 2004: 221). Additionally, according to Steve Peers, the transition period 
concerning immigration and asylum law under the Treaty of Amsterdam came to an end in May 
2004, effecting the asylum system making process once again between the European Commission, 
European Parliament, and European Council. Peers argues that, since member states were not 
allowed to make new legislative proposals post May 2004, their influence on these matters was 
greatly decreased. As voting procedures were changed, CEAS formation and implementation 
would have been slowed.  
While it was too early to address the effect of this meeting at the time Castles and Peers 
wrote their pieces, we certainly can see it now. Drawing attention away from border controls and 
slowing the process of CEAS formation and implementation, particularly in Greece in relation to 
the current crisis, was detrimental in that it created the reaction rather than proactive approach, 
since dissemination takes several years (if it is disseminated/implemented at all). Additionally, 
while it won’t be addressed in this thesis, their attention toward immigrant integration does not 
appear to be succeeding, either. I follow Castles’ argument that there is a gap between “rhetoric 
and action in EU policies in this area”, adding that it is a likely result of tumultuous policy making 
processes (2004: 221).  
 
Normative Power Europe and Broad Asylum Initiatives 
 
Policy issues, in general,  are derived from various lines of evolution EU governance has 
experienced, which have sought to enhance the functionality and governance of the EU, as a whole. 
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Scholars and politicians have debated the EU’s institutional nature since its inception and the 
beginning of European integration (Rosamond, 2000), as well as its capacity for policy 
implementation via conditionality and normative power (Manners, 2002; Macaj and Nicolaidis, 
2014). The CEAS and other policy areas in which the EU institutions do not have direct 
competency are comprised of directives as opposed to hard laws. Directives are loosely governed 
by norms established within the culture of the EU; essentially, a socially-driven pressure to 
implement directives if any given member state wants to be seen as cooperative and receive any 
form of reciprocal cooperation in the future (i.e., financial support, military support, etc.). Another 
term for this is conditionality. 
To understand why directives are often chosen as mean to systems implementation, it is 
important to understand that the EU regularly uses conditionality, or soft power, to achieve policy 
adoption (Sedelmeier, 2008; Manners, 2002; Pace, 2007; Rosamond, 2014). Normative power 
refers to the EU’s efforts to diffuse their norms and have power over opinion in many realms of 
policy – particularly those that are national competencies in which the EU has no technical 
jurisdiction (Carr, 1962; Manners, 2002). One way to enforce soft power is through conditionality 
– the use of ‘conditions’ to receive border control assistance, for example. We can see the EU’s 
use of conditionality through a variety of means; more recently, the Greek bailout package and 
physical support for the migration crisis in 2015 and beyond. To receive funds, the Greek 
Parliament and Prime Minister had to agree too certain ‘conditions’, in which they would 
implement austerity measures to reboot their economy. Due to the extreme nature of this case and 
the negative sentiment in Greece toward the EU institutions, the austerity measures were protested 
heavily and resulted in a delay of support on the Greek border at the start of the migration crisis.  
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This normative power transfers into various policy and system adoption arrangements – in 
this case, into the directives of the CEAS. It is important to realize that the EU uses soft power, or 
conditionality to achieve policy adoption in order to understand why the EU employs directives as 
means to implementation (Sedelmeier, 2008; Manners, 2002; Pace, 2007; Rosamond, 2014). This 
allows us to understand the challenges for execution of the CEAS in Greece, as a result of 
normative power influence utilized by the supranational institutions. Normative power does not 
always include conditionality; but, conditionality can often appear post-dissemination, as an 
excuse for the EU institutions not providing a good or service. For example, hypothetically 
speaking, since Greece did not implement CEAS directives, they were not afforded aid (manpower 
and money) to assist with border control at the beginning of the crisis, under the argument that 
manpower and money would be of no use since the proper measures were not yet in place for 
asylum processing.  
Gjovalin Macaj and Kalypso Nicolaidis engage in this discussion of the EU as a normative 
power (externally) through ‘one voice’ and under what conditions this unity is successful and 
under what conditions it is not (Macaj and Nicolaidis, 2014). They argue that only when interests 
converge is it plausible to pursue a ‘one voice’ mantra to serve the EU’s interests, and that that 
diversity can be a source of strength. Applying this internally, in the case of migration, it is within 
all member state interests to adopt a common asylum system, in order to mitigate illegal migration. 
However, in order for asylum policies to be effective internally, both in the EU and nationally, 
they must acknowledge the diversity of member state needs. Thus, a ‘one voice’ mantra will only 
be successful internally if it acknowledges member state needs, to the best of its ability.  
Pursuing a ‘one voice’ mantra toward external migration without taking into account 
member state diversity is what led to a disproportional effect on periphery countries due to the 
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directives and regulations in the CEAS, leading to what appears to be a lack of internal 
cohesiveness. Macaj and Nicolaidis are against the assumption that EU effectiveness will only 
occur with internal cohesiveness. While I agree with this idea for external effectiveness (mostly 
because complete internal cohesiveness is not always necessary for external matters that don’t 
directly affect the member states), I believe higher internal effectiveness is achieved with higher 
internal cohesiveness; thus, in order for normative power to be successful, there must be internal 
cohesiveness in the form of acknowledging diversity. In this case, internal cohesiveness would 
mean the acknowledgment of as many member states needs as possible (acknowledgement of 
diversity and its needs) when formulating these asylum policies.  
Stephen Castles may disagree with my assumption and may agree with Macaj and 
Nicolaidis, arguing that a liberal state is meant to be “a mechanism for aggregating and negotiating 
group interests” (Castles, 2004: 215). The idea that migration policy-making is imbued with 
‘clientelistic politics’ – meaning, heavily influenced by powerful interests and organizations 
(Freeman, 1995; Diamandourous, 1995) –  and normative undertones is “economically over-
determined, and portray the state as a mere reflection of societal interests” (Castles, 2004: 215). 
He believes that a variety of factors play influence policy outputs, making “migration policy so 
complex and contradictory” (Castles, 2004:215). Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield all agree, 
though, that “The gap between the goals of national immigration policy… and the actual results 
of policies in this area (policy outcomes) is wide and growing wider” (Cornelius, Martin, and 
Hollifield, 1994). My argument expands Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield’s assertions by insisting 
that this gap between goals and outcomes is a result of geographic and economic inequalities, 
which have been historically encouraged throughout the EU institutional building process. Some 
rational choice theorists would argue that my usage of historical institutionalist theory is merely 
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stringing together obscure details and not necessarily theory building (Thelen, 1999); but, in the 
case of EU institution-building, it shines a light on the factors which have encouraged geographical 
and economic inequalities between certain member states with the addition of analyzed data on 
asylum applications in Greece and the EU 28. The result is a deviance from the spirit of the law, 
even when the letter of the law is eventually transposed into national law. 
With this in mind, does normative power help or hinder internal cohesiveness that would 
1.) address or reinforce geographic and economic inequalities present in the EU institutions as a 
result of historical institution building, 2.) lead to greater transposition of EU migration and asylum 
directives and regulation in Greek national law, and 3.) ensure that both the letter and spirit of the 
law are maintained and implemented on the ground in Greece? Furthermore, are directives a 
sustainable, functioning type of EU law with the CEAS? This thesis uses the concept of normative 
power to support the notion that geographic and economic inequalities that have arisen from 
improper historical institution building, by arguing that they have caused a decline in CEAS 
cooperation at the EU-level, transposition delays at the Greek national level, and implementation 
issues on the ground in Greece.  
In her book EU Asylum Policies: The Power of Strong Regulating States, Natacha Zaun 
agrees that the implementation issues we see today in the CEAS are rooted in the early days of 
EU asylum system cooperation. “All attempts to reform EU asylum policies and ensure a 
working co-operation in the field will have to take these dynamics into account” (Zaun 2017: 3). 
Furthermore, Zaun argues that since the 1990s, ensuring responsibility-sharing was the primary 
motivator in EU asylum system-making (Zaun 2017:3). Top recipient countries in North-
Western Europe used these talks as an opportunity to introduce their version of functioning 
asylum systems so that the lower recipient countries would be more attractive to asylum seekers, 
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thereby ensuring more ‘refugee sharing’- particularly countries in Southern and Eastern Europe 
(Zaun 2017: 3). However, as Zaun points out, these countries neither had the infrastructure nor 
the desire to become top refugee recipients. “In the end, policy harmonization – a least in some 
instances – was a success on paper. In practice, it failed widely” (Zaun, 2017: 4).  
Zaun attribute this failure to inequalities within at least the first phase of the CEAS because 
southern EU members were weak in the decision-making process, despite initial unanimity voting. 
She asserts that the formation of the first phase of the CEAS was characterized by strong 
intergovernmental and weak supranational authority. Strong regulators in Northern Europe thereby 
established the lowest common denominator (LCD) which southern EU countries (Greece) could 
not accomplish – i.e., the ‘refugee sharing’ model’ which was impractical for many (Lavenex, 
2001: 865; Maurer and Parkes, 2007:191). 
This impracticality was first apparent when Greece was overwhelmed with refugees and 
no way to process them all in a reasonable manner. Given the reception conditions and Greece’s 
lack of infrastructure to process these hundreds of thousands of refugees, the European Council 
agreed to relocate 66,000 asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy on September 22, 2015. This 
agreement was one of the very few instances in European Institution decision making where the 
Member States utilized qualified majority voting3 to reach a decision on a non-EU competency, 
out voting smaller Member States such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia 
(Zaun, 2016: 2)4. These specific states were among the loudest protestors of this ‘refugee burden 
sharing’, recognizing the negative effect of the LCD standards and worried about their economic 
and culturally ability to accommodate these refugees.  
																																																						
3 This is significant because it usurps Member State sovereignty in a policy area that normally requires unanimity to 
implement any new procedure or regulation. The normative influence of larger, Western Europe member states is 
exemplified here, further proving impact of geographic inequalities on EU-decision making. 
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Both Slovakia and Hungary challenged this ruling before the European Court of Justice, 
feeling the requirement had been illegally imposed upon them as it stepped outside of an EU 
competency (Baczynska, 2017). Zaun discusses the damage these implementation issues do on the 
authority and usefulness of EU decision making at the supranational level. The result of the crisis 
over time has been two-fold: a breakdown in Pro-EU support, prompting further rise in already 
growing Euroscepticism, and a decrease in bilateral cooperation on a non-EU competency. “The 
EU’s so called refugee crisis is therefore essentially a management and confidence crisis in which 
Member States are careful not to commit to receiving any asylum-seekers that have not yet entered 
their territory” (Zaun, 2016: 2). The ‘responsibility-shifting’, as Zaun calls it, created a domino 
effect of national borders closing, a decrease of confidence between member states, and a holding 
pattern for asylum seekers in which they have little resources at their disposal to understand and 
apply for asylum. This shortage highlights a crucial linkage between the environment left in the 
wake of CEAS shortcomings and the public services organizations that can fill the void when 
government funding and initiatives fail– in our case, public libraries in Greece, as a reception 
country. 
 
Libraries and Public Service Organizations in the Midst 
The existence of public service and non-governmental organizations in these circumstances 
becomes crucial to assist at-risk individuals with translation of asylum documents and navigate to 
other resources; as information seeking as an ‘outsider’ can be fraught with linguistic, social, and 
economic barriers. In her article, “The stranger’s tale: information seeking as an outsider activity”, 
Frances Hultgren at the University of Boras, Sweden conducted an in-depth study and interview 
of one individual’s information seeking activities within the specific national, political, and 
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cultural context of the immigrant experience in Sweden. These interviews aimed to identify the 
usefulness of a sociological concept – the Schuetzian concept of the “stranger” (see Schuetz, 1964: 
103) – when determining and understanding the information seeking practices of an immigrant (or 
outsider). Hultgren interviews a young immigrant leaving Sweden’s equivalent of high school, 
Shirin, a refugee from Iran, intending to apply for a Swedish university in the hopes of becoming 
a lawyer. This concept of the “stranger” is a larger component of a study identifying the ways in 
which a newcomer to a social group (in this case, an immigrant) orients his or herself within the 
cultural patterns of said group. 
These interviews with Shirin revealed that social structures exist in Sweden for young 
people with ethnic and/or national roots in other countries (or, as she notes, from non-academic 
homes) that both hinder and facilitate effective informational seeking (Hultgren, 2013: 276).  
Hultgren argues that, considering this data, the information seeking behavior of immigrants, 
individuals from (recent) immigrant families, and/or those who identify with nationalities other 
than the country in which they reside are connected with Schuetz’s concept of the “stranger”5. 
Shirin, categorized as a stranger and Iranian refugee, was forced to navigate pre-collegiate tasks 
while looking into Swedish culture from the outside.  
Shirin’s information seeking behavior was different than the typically Swedish teenager in 
that, because certain resources were not formed with immigrants in mind, she had to utilize outside 
forms on information (i.e., did not rely solely on guidance and admissions counselors).  “Much of 
Shirin’s information seeking concerned finding the “right way” to do things, the “right way” to be 
and the “right attitudes” to have, and entailed information related activities more complex than 
finding the facts about becoming a lawyer (Hultgren, 2013: 285). Hultgren notes that, while the 
																																																						
5	Schutz’s concept of the stranger is defined as “an adult individual of our times who tries to be permanently 
accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches” (Schuetz, 1944: 499).  
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study is not wide and is seemingly skewed, it can be related to wider issues of information seeking 
in the context of immigrants and their social barriers that create issues of or provide opportunities 
to the access to information. This study “may be of help in the planning of research projects on a 
larger scale…[I]n a time when a discourse of nationality is pervasive and integration policies are 
under question in Europe” (2013: 275). By extension, this study can be enormously helpful in 
regards to asylum policies and related information, as well, particularly when asylum assistance is 
limited in Greece.  
The notion of public libraries as a space for immigrant assistance and integration is 
discussed in the context of Sweden by Jamie Johnston in her article, “The use of conversation-
based programming in public libraries to support integration in increasingly multiethnic societies” 
(Johnston, 2016). Her paper theoretically explores how certain types of programming – 
conversation based, in this particular case – might support the integration of immigrants into the 
community. While integration-supporting programming is quite different from asylum assistance, 
as one encourages integration into the reception country and the other potentially assists with 
transferring a refugee to another reception country (in the case of Greece), it supports the notion 
of meeting the information seeking needs for refugees and immigrants in a comfortable space with 
culturally tolerant individuals.  
Tamara Brathwaite, librarian at the Institute of International Relations, University of the 
West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, and Tabago, began researching the interaction of refugees 
and asylum seekers and library services in the Caribbean region in 2000. On one typical work day 
she had an atypical encounter with a Middle Eastern man who only spoke Arabic. “You could read 
in his eyes that he needed help,” Brathwaite mentions (Braithwaite, 2007: 1). Fortunately, the 
Director of the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) spoke Arabic and was able to discover 
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that the man was searching for information on the United Nations and how he could apply for 
asylum. Since then, Braithwaite says she has had several more encounters with asylum seekers 
from a variety of countries seeking assistance at her library.  
 Braithwaite’s case and research are significant in several ways – primarily in that the flow 
of migration and asylum seeking in the Caribbean is comparable to that which Greece has 
experienced over the last few decades. Like the Mediterranean region, the Caribbean is deeply 
intertwined with a history of migrating peoples, as “present-day Caribbean societies were largely 
formed through immigration, both forced and free” (Thomas-Hope, 2003: 48).  Asylum seekers 
from Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Africa often travel to more commercialized 
locations under U.S. or U.K. purview, such as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the Cayman Islands, and 
even the Florida Keys. As Braithwaite notes, asylum seekers from Africa and the Middle East are 
often met with xenophobia when trying to enter directly into the U.S. Thus, the Caribbean is a very 
attractive location in which to begin, with the probable goal of entering wealthier, established 
countries.  
This has and continues to encourage what Braithwaite calls the ‘migration industry’ – or, 
in layman’s terms, the facilitation of the movement of people from one country or continent to 
another often by unusual or illegal means (Braithwaite, 2007: 2). This scenario is, again, 
comparable with that in Greece since 2015. Asylum seekers, traveling from Syria with the hopes 
of reaching central or northern Europe via the ‘migration industry’, look for asylum assistance in 
Greece. Blocked from entering Europe further by the Balkan states, asylum seekers settle for 
Greece. This blockage was due to more restrictive asylum policies that are a direct result of 
xenophobia, terrorism, and conservative agendas. The same holds true now with Turkey being the 
gatekeeper, due to even more restrictive measure set in place late-2016. The Caribbean became a 
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landing country for the ‘migration industry’ after September 11th, 2001 – Greece, after several 
terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and elsewhere.  
However, while these cases show that some see libraries as a safe place for outsiders, it is 
important to determine whether or not they have access to the types of information refugees in 
particular would be interested in: asylum processes and further pertinent information of the 
functioning of the European Union. In one of the scarce articles that discusses the role of public 
libraries in disseminating EU information, Sanjica Tanackovic, Ivana Horvatic, and Milijana 
Micunovic investigate the provision of EU information in an acceding country, Croatia, in their 
piece entitled, “Provision of the European Union information in an acceding country: A survey of 
the role of public libraries in Croatia” (Tanackovic, et. al 2016). This study conducted via an online 
questionnaire in public libraries within Croatia asked respondents their opinion about the role 
public libraries should and do play in educating the public about EU institutions, policies, 
accession laws, and the status of Croatia in the midst of their accession process. Their findings 
revealed that the majority of respondents believe it is an important task for libraries to educate 
citizens about the EU while also maintaining political neutrality. While ‘citizen’ is the key word 
here, it was likely wording established by the surveyors and not necessarily by the respondents. 
With this in mind, we can infer that individuals think it is important for libraries to educate those 
wishing to remain in the EU about EU policies, institutions, etc. Additionally, recent 
Eurobarometer surveys show that the general public feels uninformed about EU matters, despite 
information dissemination initiatives such as European Documentation Centres (EDCs), Euro Info 
Centres, Innovation Relay Centres, Info Points Europe, Public Information Relay (PIR), and 
European Public Information Centres (EPICs) (Eurobarometer 2014; Tanackovic, et. al 2016: 
454).  
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METHODS AND DATA 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of this research project, I utilized two different methods for 
what were initially seemingly unrelated questions and projects. As I began to delve more into each 
topic, it was clear that the shortcomings associated with the Common European Asylum System 
were impacting public service organizations – libraries, in this case – who were assuming 
responsibility for government information resource access and assistance in certain areas of 
Europe. I found that three questions needed to be answered: 1. What is the CEAS approach and 
strategy for asylum seekers; 2. What is the source of their dysfunctionality; and 3. How is this 
impacting local and regional levels within member states like this case study of Greece? Questions 
one and two required a three-level historical analysis of the formation of EU asylum strategy, 
including how the internal governing structure of the EU institutions impacted the CEAS formation 
process. Three levels were necessary due to the internal structure of the EU institutions and how 
policy formation, in general, and decisions of a similar nature pass through institutions and 
member states. Question three required a more specialized, pointed approach in which I attempted 
to collect anonymous survey data to determine the usage of public libraries by refugees in Greece. 
After four months of electronic dissemination, the survey yielded no results. The process of 
disseminating this survey and possible reasons for this outcome will be discussed below; however, 
the lack of results, which was data in itself, initiated a different approach in which I examined the 
proximity of libraries to detention centers and points of migrant entry. These methods are further 






I examined the Common European Asylum System and Greek national asylum and 
migration policy using a three-level, comparative historical approach to explore the process and 
outcome of CEAS negotiation, implementation, and effect. This approach assists in determining 
the interdependence between the EU supranational institutions and its member states, and the 
delicate relationship between EU competencies and national (sovereign) competencies. This 
process additionally helped me determine how the change in EU governing structure and internal 
political discourse over time6 affected the formation of the CEAS, the relationship the periphery 
EU countries had with the EU institutions at the time, and what injustices this encouraged as a 
result.  
In the top level, EU migration and asylum law, the CEAS was examined both from a 
historical perspective from 1994-2015, and a text-based analysis of each five components of the 
system. From the historical perspective, I outline the progression of its formation as it passed 
through the central EU institutions (EU Commission, European Council, European Parliament, 
and Council of Ministers) by examining Communications of asylum plans published from 
Brussels. Afterward, I examined the effect of the most important political events and treaty 
changes on the CEAS as it passed through said institutions during the designated examination 
period.  The text-based analysis encompassed the changes made during phase two of the CEAS to 
the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, and the Dublin Regulation 
– with primary attention on the Dublin Regulation, due to its importance in navigating asylum and 
																																																						
6	My results assume the historical institutionalist theory that the progression of institutional change 
correlates to and has caused shortcomings at the supranational level in regards to migration procedure, 
leading to a path of dependency on these ineffective procedures. Thus, EU migration and asylum system 
formation allowed me to explore the geopolitical nature of producing legislation in the EU.	
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migration procedures in this unique setting7. I do not include and analysis of the Eurodac 
Regulation and the Qualifications Directive due to length constraints. I chose the former three 
components because of the availability of data through the European Commission and their 
importance in relation to the current migration crisis.  
At the second level, I examine national migration and asylum law of Greece to determine 
how they transposed asylum and migration strategies into national legal contexts. As a gatekeeper 
country, proximally close to many areas of conflict over the last four decades, possessing a strong 
sense of ethnic nationalism, and geographically distant from the heart of Europe (Germany and 
France), Greece’s reactions to larger conflicts have been pivotal for migration and asylum 
procedural areas. The political discourse generated from CEAS transposition into national law had 
an effect on both the top level of EU law and the second level of national implementation.  
I consulted data from Eurostat, Asylum Information Database (AID), and the Greek 
Council for Refugees (GCR) web pages on the process of and difficulties faced during the asylum 
process. Eurostat has the most extensive data, which they collect from Member States’ Ministries 
of Interior and immigration agencies, based on strict methodological guidelines. Eurostat has four 
primary data collection procedures, according to their website, which includes different 
periodicities. Asylum data is collected monthly (applications), quarterly (first instance decisions) 
and annually (final instance decisions). They collect Dublin Regulation data, residence permit data, 
and enforcement of migration legislation annually. The AID provides detailed historical and 
																																																						
7	Asylum and migration are considered member state competencies only, meaning the EU institutions do not 
develop laws or policies that address it directly. The Dublin Regulation addresses it indirectly, however, in that 
asylum seekers are required to apply for asylum in the country of entry – thus, forcing periphery countries, up until 
2015, to be responsible for processing asylum paperwork. This creates a great imbalance of equality amongst the 
member states – particularly between periphery vs. non-periphery (which tend to be the wealthier, ‘old’ member 
states of central Europe). It also places pressure on ‘gatekeeper’ countries such as Greece (meaning the entry point 
countries into the Schengen Zone, presumed responsible for monitoring migration at the EU border) to process all 
migrants trying to enter Europe.	
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present day information on asylum and migration procedures and law, based on the analysis of 
government communications, Greek NGO statistics, and UNHCR observations. AID is an affiliate 
of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles and thus has the potential for bias since the 
European Commission partially funds them. The GCR provides on the ground accounts of asylum 
conditions from their Legal Aid, Reception Center, Social, and Interpretation Units. While they 
are an NGO, they are still funded, in part, by European Institutions and have the potential for bias. 
Lastly, the third level approach examines the CEAS from a national implementation 
standpoint by looking at how many asylum cases were processed in 2015 in Greece, how the EU 
and Greece enforced portions of phase I and II of the CEAS, and national implementation (or lack 
thereof) as a result of economic and geographic inequalities and/or deep-seeded inter-ethnic issues. 
The analysis allows me to compare the goals and expectations set forth by phase II of the CEAS 
and the actual outcome it produced in Greece, as well as catalysts that may have prevented or 
encouraged its success. The expectation was to yield results that proved the economic and 
geographic disadvantage Greece is at compared to other more influential EU countries, such as 
Germany, who may be fiscally able to accept more asylum seekers and process them quickly and 
humanely. The results allowed me to ascertain the letter of the law versus the spirit of the law in 
Greece, which ultimately affects the second level of national law transposition and the top level of 
EU law, by reducing the EU’s normative power.  
I consulted data of asylum cases from the UNHCR website. At the time of my access, they 
collected this data on a daily basis from their on-site border locations in Greece, which their 
website updates on a regular basis. The data includes a record of how many arrivals by sea into 
Greece there are since the beginning of 2016, how many are dead/missing in 2016, gender 
demographics of asylum seekers, and critical weekly developments on the border. My data ranges 
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from the beginning of 2016 until the end of 2016, at which point I cut off collection. They collect 
some of their data from migrant survivors and family members, UNHCR staff, Coast Guard or 
Navy vessels, and government officials, exposing the sample to inaccuracies and biases. UNHCR 
states that every effort is taken to verify their statistical information. 
 
Method II 
Beginning shortly after the migration crisis began, various information institutions 
throughout Northern and Central Europe – namely, public libraries – began offering various levels 
of programming and assistance to asylum seekers, those with designated refugee status, and new 
immigrants to their countries. International information organizations began tracking and 
publishing comprehensives lists of these information resources available to the at-risk populations, 
in an effort to spread models for refugee assistance far and wide (EBLIDA, 2017). These resources 
vary from language promotion kits to mentors for refugees (Germany), collections in the native 
tongues of the new populations (the Netherlands), assistance with filing the asylum paperwork 
(Sweden), mobile libraries for those in more remote areas (Northern Greece), and more. 
Additionally, after discovering more in-depth reports and articles discussing the usage of public 
libraries by refugees in Scandinavia and the Caribbean (Pyatetsky, 2015; Braithwaite, 2007), I felt 
it prudent to delve into the role public libraries were playing in Greece, as well – Greece being one 
of the foremost countries of entry for the recent wave of migrants into the EU. Additionally, while 
it was widely thought that asylum seekers would not settle in Greece due to the economic 
difficulties, Greece is, like other EU countries, required to take their “quota” of refugees (Kanter, 
2017). Thus there would be asylum seekers and refugees regardless of the preconceived notion 
that Greece was merely a passing country. 
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To obtain a better sense of the level of interaction librarians in Greece may have had with 
these populations, I developed an anonymous survey in which I asked respondents whether or not 
they served asylum seeker, refugee, and/or migrant populations, what types of resources these 
patrons were looking for, how this potentially larger flow of patrons impacted their day-to-day 
activities and staffing structure, whether or not they partnered with religious or non-governmental 
organizations to assist these patrons, and if there were any major language barriers associated with 
their reference interviews. I disseminated this survey through email to contacts in managerial 
positions within the library system in Greece who are well-known and respected individuals in 
their Greek library community. The survey was then passed on through professional library 
listservs, distributed widely across the country to Greek librarians. The survey was additionally 
posted on the social media accounts of these well-known Greek librarians. Due to the breadth of 
survey dissemination in addition to the successful models of asylum seeker, refugee, and migrant 
assistance in other European libraries, I expected some responses from the survey – especially with 
Greece as a reception country and having tens of thousands of asylum seekers enter Greece and 
remain in Athens (UNHCR, 2016).  
Due to time constraints and a lack of financial resources, I was unable to distribute this 
survey widely on the ground in paper form; however, in a large study done by Baruch and Holtom 
(2008), electronic data collection efforts often had as many or more responses than paper surveys. 
I anticipated an online survey to be easier to use based on Bonometti and Tang’s (2006) theoretical 
framework that discusses the great advantages for web-based surveys with back-end databases 
interfaces and analytical frameworks. While my survey platform (Webtools) was not incredibly 
sophisticated in manner, it still offered some data collection and analysis tools. Additionally, while 
it is well documented that online surveys require financial or in-kind compensation can be 
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successful in increasing response rates, I was unable to provide this due to funding and time 
constraints (Duetskens, et. al, 2004; Sauermann and Roach, 2013).  
The abovementioned limitations may have resulted in the unexpected yet unavoidable 
consequence of zero survey responses. This outcome, in addition to some informal conversations 
with Greek librarians, signaled to me that refugees might not be not using Greek libraries in the 
way that other refugees were in the abovementioned research projects and articles. These informal 
discussions revealed that some librarians were surprised by my questions. This was an indication 
of cultural difference between what I as an American student in Library and Information Science 
and what they as library professionals believed their civic role to be in the context of the 
shortcomings left by the CEAS and information resource shortage as a result. Knowing of 
successful models in other parts of Europe and the U.S. and with the assumption that one’s library 
patron community includes anyone who enters the physical or virtual space of the library, I fully 
expected eagerness and already existing programming for asylum seekers, refugees, and 
immigrants. However, there was no programming that I could uncover and no indication of this 
at-risk population using the libraries for information seeking needs. 
What followed after my trip to Athens and these informal discussions was an attempt to 
encapsulate the reasoning for this deviation using a geographic analysis to determine the spatial 
distance between refugee detention centers and entry points and the public libraries in Greece. To 
support my hypothesis that, due to geographic distance, library structure, and the correlation 
between intended settling country and refugee information seeking needs, refugees were not and 
are unlikely to utilize the Greek public library system, I also collected historical information about 
the structure and history of Greek libraries and its relationship to the clientelistic practices often 
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equated to Greek society (Diamandouros, 1994). These various efforts resulted in some 












































EU Migration and Asylum Procedure 
 EU Institutional Function 
 In order to understand that politics involved with policy making and transposition, in 
general, in the EU, it is important to know how the EU institutions work with each other and what 
competencies (allowances) they have with policy formation, transposition, and enforcement. 
These competencies effect the direction of policy development, including which countries do or 
do not benefit from the systems and policies developed under their guidance. Agenda setting is 
driven differently in each EU institution, particularly depending on whether the institution votes 
by unanimity or Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). It is important to note how these EU 
institutions interact with the CEAS and the Greek national government.  
European Council 
 Formally established as an EU institution in 2009, the European Council consists of the 
heads of state or government of every member state, in addition to the European Commission 
President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy. The European 
Council decides on the EU’s political priorities and policy direction, passing these opinions onto 
the EC to form EU law; they handle intergovernmental issues that cannot be resolved amongst 
member states; set the EU’s common foreign and security policy; and nominate and appoint 
candidates to certain high profile EU roles (European Union, 2016). In some ways, the European 
Council has the greatest political power amongst all the institutions – particularly since they choose 





 The European Commission (EC) is the executive body of the European Union, representing 
the interests of the supranational body of the EU. It is made up of 27 Commissioners, one from 
each member state. Seven of those Commissioners are Vice-Presidents and one the President who 
is chosen by the European Council. The EC is held accountable to the European Parliament. The 
individual Commissioners do not have decision-making powers, making the voting procedure in 
the EC based on consensus in most occasions. This prevents headway on sensitive and contentious 
issues such national border controls during a migration crisis. 
 The Vice-Presidents are responsible for priority projects and portfolios, which range from 
agriculture to migration. The Commission President plays a significant role for the EU, setting 
policy agenda and directions, assigning portfolios to particular Commissioners, and represents EU 
interests, internationally. The President, while elected by the European Council, must be approved 
by the European Parliament as of the Lisbon Treaty – giving the European Parliament more 
responsibility and agenda-setting power.  
 In regards to the EC’s competency on migration, until 2015, they took a more normative 
approach on migration in conjunction with the European Council – meaning that they did not 
intercede on migration issues in the periphery countries. Other than issues with the Schengen Zone, 
migration is a member state competency. The lines of competency have been blurred during the 
current migration crisis, because it is not simply an individual member state problem: it affects the 
whole of the EU. This is due to the fact that the entry-point countries like Greece are not the final 





 The European Parliament (EP) is a legislative, supervisory, and budgetary body, directly 
elected by the citizens of each member state of whom the parliamentarians represent. The number 
of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) per member state is roughly proportional to 
the number of citizens in the country. This is by degressive proportionality, with no country having 
fewer than 6 or more than 96 MEPs total (Europa.eu, n.d.). In its legislative capacity, the EP passes 
laws together with the Council of the EU, based on EC agenda setting and proposals. For migration 
procedures, this ensures that EC agenda setting and personal interests are ‘checked’ (European 
Union, 2016, “The European Parliament”). This law-making process would have formed the 
directives within the CEAS. 
 The Council of the European Union 
 Not to be confused with the European Council, the Council of the European Union (CEU) 
consists of government ministers from each EU country, per policy area (i.e. agricultural ministers, 
trade ministers, etc.). According to the EU official website, the CEU is the main decision-making 
body together with the EP, adopting proposals produced by the EC. Its role is to be a more direct 
voice between the citizens of each member state and the supranational bodies.  
 The European Court of Justice 
 Finally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the judicial branch of the EU, ensuring that 
designated EU law is “interpreted and applied the same in every EU country; ensuring countries 
and the EU institutions abide by EU law” (European Union, 2016, “Court of Justice of the 
European Union”). There is one judge from each country, ensuring equal representation. For the 
purpose of my analysis, the most important role of the ECJ is to enforce the law via infringement 
proceedings should a national government fail to comply to EU law. The proceedings can be 
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initiated by an EU institution or by another national government, thus opening the opportunity for 
member states to accuse Greece of not complying to CEAS Regulations such as the Dublin II. 
  
Politics 
The EU has long history of migration between countries, particularly after a few significant 
milestones in European history including (but not limited to): the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
Berlin Wall, and the establishment of the Schengen Zone. According to the “Green Paper on the 
future of the European Migration Network (EMN)”, the EU has been monitoring asylum and 
migration trends since 1994, when “the European Commission stressed in its first communication 
on immigration and asylum policies the value of creating a mechanism to monitor migration flows 
on a comprehensive and EU-wide basis” in response to events as described above (EUR-Lex, 
2003). However, it took until December of 2001 for the Laeken European Council (the so-called 
‘feasible study’ being carried out once, in 1994, they decided to communicate on possible 
immigration issues and trends) to invite the European Commission “to establish a system for 
exchange of information on asylum, migration and countries of origin” (EUR-Lex, 2003). It then 
took several more years to set up the EMN (2002), for the European Council of Thessaloniki to 
endorse the EMN (2003), and for the European Council to realize the EMN project’s importance 
in establishing a (presumably shared) European asylum and migration policy (2004). A common, 
official procedure on migration8 adopted across all member states did not exist in 2015 even though 
it is one of their medium to long term priorities for the European Agenda on Migration (European 
Commission, “European Agenda on Migration”). This drawn-out process of EMN establishment 
is evidence of a severe problem within EU policy and system negotiation: their dirge-like pace 
																																																						
8 Notably, while often spoken about together in EU legislative documentation, migration procedure is 
different from asylum procedure. 
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with research and subsequent asylum system development is not quick enough to keep pace with 
migration flows and any subsequent issues that arise. They attempt to be proactive to EU-wide 
issues; but, instead are undermining their efforts with a lackadaisical approach.  
This formation issue extends into the implementation and national transposition, as well. 
It exists because there are two types of EU-wide rules: regulations/decisions and directives. 
Regulations and decisions are “legislative acts of the EU which are immediately applicable as law 
in all EU countries…[without] a need for a change in national law” (European Union, n.d., “EU 
Immigration Rules”). Directives, on the other hand, are more freely interpreted based on the 
member state’s needs. “While directives are binding as to the results to be achieved, individual 
countries can choose the form and methods. Most EU-wide immigration rules come from 
directives” (European Union, n.d., “EU Immigration Rules”). Immigration rules, similar to 
military policies, fall under the purview of member state sovereignty. It is then left to the EU 
member states to implement many EU-wide immigration rules. Furthermore, each members state 
alone decides the total number of migrants permitted entry, all final decisions on applications, 
long-term visa rules, and the conditions for which to obtain residence and work permits when there 
is no EU-wide rule to do (European Union, n.d., “EU Immigration Rules”). Within the EU’s history 
of asylum system making, the described formation and implementation issues come to light. 
 
Politics of The Common European Asylum System 
Delving into EU-asylum procedure, I examine the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS), which was imagined in 1999, the first ‘phase’ implemented in 2006, and the second phase 
in reimagined in 2012. Communication from the European Commission notes that “even after 
some legislative harmonization at EU level has taken place, a lack of common practice, different 
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traditions and diverse country of origin information sources are, among other reasons, producing 
divergent results” (EU Commission, 2008:3). The rest of the communication from the EC 
acknowledges, in detail, the uneven playing field created as a result of member states taking 
liberties on these EU directives. What was the Commission’s response? Directives are 
acknowledging that their previous directives need to be implemented more evenly and equitably 
across the board, so as to encourage a more expedient and humane common asylum practice. It 
does not, however, indicate how this will be achieved. 
According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the directives governing the 
second phase of CEAS should have been finalized by 2012 (ECRE, From Schengen to Stockholm, 
a history of the CEAS). A report from the Department of Justice and Home Affairs wasn’t 
published until 2014, begging the question: why did it take them another two years to establish the 
framework for phase two? Was it knowledge of an impending refugee crisis due to the state of 
political and religious upheaval in Syria; and, if this were the case, why is the EU still struggling 
to treat refugees humanely and process their application swiftly?  
 
Geographic Issues Under the Common European Asylum System Phase II 
This second phase of the CEAS includes a revised Asylum Procedures Directive; a revised 
Reception Conditions Directive; a revised Qualifications Directive; the revised Dublin Regulation; 
and the revised Eurodac Regulation. This section will focus on the revised Dublin Regulation, 
which primarily impacts the periphery EU member states and hinders both their ability to 
successfully implement system procedures, their incentive to apply such procedures, and the 
inherent difficulty in forming new procedures and systems due to the previous precedence; and, 
will also incorporate an examination of the asylum procedures directive as it relates to the Dublin 
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Regulation. The Dublin Regulation’s emergent effects negatively impact countries on the 
periphery of the EU – Greece and Italy, mostly, in 2015 via it clause that states, “where the asylum 
seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a member state, that Member State will be 
responsible for examining the asylum application” (EUR-Lex; Dublin II). In 2015 when roughly 
four million refugees are expected to enter the EU illegally – whether through the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, or Western Mediterranean (Frontex, 2015) – Spain, Italy, 
and Greece are legally required to handle all asylum paperwork under Dublin II. Being amongst 
the more profoundly affected member states during the economic crisis of 2008, these countries 
hardly bear the infrastructure required to handle such a massive wave of immigrants with their 
government debts being well over one-hundred percent of their GDP (Eurostat, 2014). While most 
immigrants – those taking the Eastern Mediterranean route through Turkey and Greece, 
specifically – aim to settle in the richer, northern EU member states (Germany, Sweden, and 
others), the country of entry is still responsible for processing asylum paperwork under Dublin II.  
The paper on phase II of the Common European Asylum System as described above boasts 
new “sound procedures for the protection of asylum applicants and improves the system’s 
efficiency” under the Dublin Regulation (EU Justice and Home Affairs, 2014:7). One of these 
“sound procedures” claims to include: “an early warning, preparedness and crisis management 
mechanism, geared to addressing the root dysfunctional causes of national asylum systems or 
problems stemming from particular pressures” (EU Justice and Home Affairs, 2014:7). While the 
EU’s border and coast guard agency, Frontex, has increased their presence at the Greek border 
starting in late 2015, before this, Greek border agents were exceptionally overwhelmed with 
migrant flow. The unpreparedness resulted in hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers passing 
through the border unchecked and undocumented. 
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The revised Dublin Regulation was still classified as a regulation and not a directive, 
meaning the unsuccessful crisis management system was an implementation issue from the 
supranational level and not merely a shortcoming from a national transposition and 
implementation perspective. Without the crisis management tools and resources to succeed in 
implementing such a system, Greece has no incentive to solve the issues – especially considering 
the negative sentiment directed toward them throughout the economic crisis and the “failed 
gatekeeper” persona instilled upon them by anti-immigrant parties. 
 
Cultural Issues of the Common European Asylum System 
Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs, states that the new CEAS (phase II) 
“will provide better access to the asylum procedure…will lead to fairer, quicker, better quality 
asylum decisions; will ensure that people in fear of persecution will not be returned to danger; and 
will provide dignified and decent conditions both for those who apply for asylum and those who 
are granted…protection within the EU” (EU Justice and Home Affairs, 2014:2). She also notes 
that their ‘achievement’ is not yet complete; greater effort must be put forth to implement this 
legislation and ensure it will function well and uniformly. These are two very powerful statements 
in the opening three paragraphs of this communication. It is promising that she acknowledges the 
pitfalls and issues the EU has had with past asylum and immigration policies. However, there are 
two misgivings with this statement. First, providing dignified and decent conditions for both those 
who apply for asylum and are granted it EU-wide has been far out of the EU’s reach due cultural 
clashes, economic deficiencies and religious intolerance, amongst other instigators. These cultural 
differences enforce resistance to implementing the Asylum Procedures Directive and the 
Reception Conditions Directive, assuming they are even transposed into national law. Second, 
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while she is a respected, high-ranking Commissioner, her term only lasted four years. She is now 
the European Commissioner for Trade and serves little purpose toward her CEAS formation 
efforts. The current Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs is Dimitris Avramopoulos of 
Greece, who should, in theory, help ensure the continuation and further (hopefully) positive 
alterations to the CEAS as Greece is an entry point for most refugees. However, the second phase 
of the CEAS was established in such a way that has caused periphery countries to be punished 
under the illusion that this newly revised version, which took seven years to be developed, would 
function well and uniformly. Avramopoulos is in a position that limits his capacity for policy 
formation due to the precedence set by former Commissioners and guidelines. 
 
National Transposition 
Many of the cultural and ideological issues we see in Greece today are the result of their 
tumultuous political history, which was heavily influenced by other major European powers 
(namely, the UK, France, Germany, and Russia). According to Anna Triandafyllidou and 
Mariangela Veikou’s 2002 article "The Hierarchy of Greekness: Ethnic and National Identity 
Considerations in Greek Immigration Policy", immigration policy developed in the early 
2000s redefined Greek national identity, so much so that it privileged some groups and not others. 
"Pressures for immigrant integration and control stemming from Greece’s integration into the EU 
and its participation in the Schengen treaty, on the one hand, and the need to deal with a perceived 
situation of increasing internal unrest, on the other hand, have led to a whole set of new 
developments in Greek immigration policy" (2007: 191).	They believe national loyalties tied to 
ethnic descent and sovereignty to former nation states threaten further immigrant integration and 
harmonious European integration. These concepts align directly with their “Hierarchy of 
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Greekness” concept discussed later in their article, as well as Nikiforos Diamandourous’ theory of 
the underdog culture in Greece. Further research into this matter may yield insights and 
connections between xenophobic fears of immigrants and the ‘other’ and rates of national law 
transposition. 
These concepts and Greece’s history with migration policy and asylum system formation 
help us understand the difficulties Greece faces in developing immigration policies. First, due to 
such little effort and emphasis given to migration and asylum procedure, they show why the 
bureaucracy has had such a difficult time defining how exactly they feel, as a country, about both 
co-ethnic returnees and non-Greek immigrants and subsequently how they should handle migrants. 
Second, they set the precedence for why or why not Greece chooses to cooperate with or accept 
European asylum strategies that, due to their broadly defined definitions of how to treat asylum 
seekers, do not address the concerns of a nation on the forefront of migration crises. This results 
in Greece being unprepared to handle the current migration crisis in infrastructure as well as 
socioculturally. 
 
Greece’s CEAS Issues: Asylum Procedure Adherence 
According to Anna Triandafyllidou’s article on Mediterranean migration problems, after 
1989, Greece and Italy became hosts to a massive influx of immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union. In Greece, immigration since the late 1980s have included (Triandafyllidou 2007:78):  
• About 150,000 co-ethnic ‘returnees’ and/or their descendants from the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Armenia (all commonly known as Pontic Greeks); 	
• About 100,000 Greek Albanian immigrants (ethnic Greek Albanian citizens known as Vorioepirotes) 	
• As of 2001, roughly 600,000 documented immigrants from non-EU countries (other than the categories 
mentioned previously); another 300,000 estimated to be in the country without legal migration status today 	
About 10,000 Greek emigrants from northern Europe, the US, Canada and Australia  
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“In short, Greece has passed from virtually no immigration in the late 1980s to about 1.25 million 
immigrants (about 12 percent of the total population of the country) today [2007], including both 
legal and undocumented migrants" (Triandafyllidou, 2007:78). This number has drastically 
increased since 2014. 
Greece lacked a comprehensive immigration policy to handle all of these former Soviet 
Republic refugees; and, while the EU first imagined the CEAS in 1999, the first phase was not 
completed until the mid-2000s, leaving Greece to process this wave of refugees on their own. 
Many of their policies were typically inadequately implemented and partially designed 
immigration laws. The hundreds of thousands of immigrants entered Greece via borders between 
Albania or Bulgaria, by airports as 'tourists', or by sea, traveling the Aegean with help from 
smugglers. The first law tackling immigration in 1991 entitled "Entry, exit, sojourn, employment, 
removal of aliens, procedure for the recognition of refugees and other measures" was one of many 
improperly implemented and designed immigration laws that follow for the next twenty-five years. 
These plague Greece to this day, resulting in many illegal immigrants falling through the 
bureaucratic cracks, immigrant integration issues, and an increase in xenophobic sentiment. 
  The implementation of the 1991 program was lacking, causing many to not pass the 
application requirements and thus slip back into the cracks as undocumented. It did, however, lay 
the framework for future immigration legislation and also provided statistical insight into these 
undocumented workers (2007: 81). Presidential decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997 eventually 
regularized these immigrants, offering applications for White Cards (limited duration permit; 
371,641 applied) and Green Cards (one, two, or five-year duration card; 212,860 applied) to 
undocumented immigrants seeking work.  Law 2910/2001 "Entry and sojourn of foreigners in the 
Greek” territory provided naturalization and “other measures", and was meant to deal with 
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immigration in the medium to long term (2007: 81). It provided border control measures, channels 
of legal entry into Greece for employment, family, studies, asylum, etc., and also regulated the 
conditions for naturalization of aliens residing in Greece. 368,000 applied for legal status under 
this measure; but, there were insufficient resources, implementation problems due to their one-
year permits expiring before legal paperwork finished, and it was an expensive procedure 
dissuading one from applying a second time. 
 The 2001, “Action Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants” (for the period 2002-
2005) was, by far, the most important step toward a productive immigration system. It covered the 
inclusion of immigrants into labor market, access to health care, measures promoting cultural 
dialogue and combating xenophobia and racism within Greek Society. Subsequent policies, such 
as the August 2005, 'Entry, stay and integration of third country nationals in Greece' (effective 
January 1, 2006) were meant to simplify procedures, unify residence and work permit documents, 
clarify family reunion conditions, and address the status of human trafficking victims. "However, 
this bill [and clearly its predecessors] has been criticized…for continuing to ignore the majority of 
the country’s illegal migrant population, for not effectively transposing the EU directives on family 
reunification and long-term resident status into national legislation (under phase one of the CEAS), 
for introducing ill-designed integration tests in relation to the adoption of the long-term resident 
status, and for imposing unreasonably high fees for stay/work permit applications" (2007: 82). The 
2005 plan, however, "has been criticized…for continuing to ignore the majority of the country’s 
illegal migrant population, for not transposing the EU directives on family reunification and long-






National Implementation  
Letter of the Law versus the Spirit of the Law 
  Before June 7th, 2013, Greece’s asylum procedure and reception centers lacked 
competency in registering and processing asylum seekers. The only authorities capable of 
receiving and processing asylum requests were: The Asylum Departments of the Aliens Divisions 
of Attica (in Athens) and Thessaloniki, the Security Departments of the National airports, and the 
sub-Directorates and Security Departments of the Police Directorates across the country (53 in 
total) (Asylum Information Database). Reports from Greek NGOs stated that asylum procedures 
– particularly in Athens – were not practiced correctly (Human Rights Watch, 2011). These 
problems ranged from cases being pushed back and forth to other departments, to asylum seekers 
unable to find housing and social services during the application process. An examination of the 
revised CEAS Receptions Directive from 2012 (phase II) indicates that asylum seekers should 
have access to housing, food, healthcare, employment, and medical and psychological care, going 
forward. Greece’s response was a new asylum procedure under Article 1(3) L 3907/2011, which 
ensured that 13 Regional Asylum Offices (RAOs) were established in Attica, Thessaloniki, 
Alexandroupolis, Orestiada, Ioannina, Volos, Heraklion, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and 
Rhodes (Asylum Information Database). This expanded the reception centers and individuals able 
to process asylum applications. Despite this and the CEAS restricting “the detention of vulnerable 
person, in particular minors”, there have been many reports of detention, poor reception conditions 
(lack of food, fresh water, and violence [physical and sexual]) 
  The pushbacks created another obstacle under the old procedure in that asylum seekers 
were required to provide an address in Greece to apply for asylum. Asylum application data from 
Eurostat is very telling of the shortcomings Greece encounters with processing asylum claims 
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under the revised Dublin II regulation9 and as a result of the pitfalls associated with their own 
national system. Looking at Table 1, the absence of numbers in 2015 is extremely telling of the 
lack of asylum registration at the Greek border. As it is one of the most highly-trafficked migratory 
routes for Syrian refugees (see Table 2), we should expect that Greece is processing hundreds of 
thousands of asylum applications under the Dublin II regulation. But, Germany had a little over 
476,000 applications in 2015 - most of which came from Greece. 
 
 












26,845 32,910 48,475 53,235 77,485 126,705 202,645 476,510 
EU 28 
applicants 
225,150 263,835 259,400 309,040 335,290 431,090 626,960 1,321,600 
Table 1 Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded), 
Greece and the EU, 2008-2015 (Eurostat.) 
																																																						
9	It is important to note that many EU countries in 2016 are ignoring the Dublin II regulation, in order to 




Figure 1 Main European migration routes, directions of illegal border crossings, 2015. 
	
Greek Identity Formation: A Catalyst for Implementation Issues 
 Looking at the current wave of immigrants (Syrians, Afghanis, Iranians, and some other 
small groups of Middle Easterners), it is important to note that they: 1.) have no ethnic ties to 
Greece, unlike the former co-ethnic returnees much of the immigration literature speaks of before 
the late 2000s, and 2.) are predominantly Muslim. The lack of a common cultural and the presence 
of a turbulent past with Ottoman Empire leads to an immense integration issue, particularly since 
these immigrants have no desire to stay in Greece. These cultural differences remove some 
incentives Greece would have in implementing asylum procedures – particularly if it means 
integrating these immigrants into society, if even for a short time until they gain permanent 
residence in another member state. Unlike 'co-ethnics', Middle Eastern immigrants are not entitled 
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to a favorable legal status. Thus, they are classified as ‘aliens’ and are virtually at the outermost 
circle of Greek identity as previously described. The EU’s delayed response to post-Soviet 
immigration and asylum exacerbated Greece’s integration issues, as well as the most recent crisis, 
and the implementation issues of previous directives and regulations. This left a procedural gap 
that Greece attempted to fill; but, did so poorly. Additionally, with the addition of large groups of 
different ethnicities and cultures, the sociocultural atmosphere in the country has produced a small, 
but noticeable gathering of anti-immigrant, incredibly racist groups. Focus has shifted from 
proactive migration and asylum procedure to reactive policies that attempt to mitigate racial 
violence and sentiment. 
 
Greece’s Migration Woes in the Present 
Focusing specifically on 2015 and 2016, we can now see negative effects in Greece’s 
infrastructure and culture as a result of both Greece and the EU’s unwillingness to follow through 
with asylum directives. These effects have been sociocultural, political, and economic in nature; 
but, mostly affecting Greek society and economy. As previously discussed, Greece has an 
established history of immigrant integration issues. While most assume the majority of current 
refugees do not intend to stay in Greece, already established is a xenophobic sentiment in the 
country that has been gaining popularity since the Syriza party was elected in January 2015. The 
members of the European parliament from Greece exemplify this trend, with roughly half aligned 
with the center-right (five in the European People’s Party [from the NDP]) or very far right (five 




The Impact of Greece’s Cultural, Economic, and Geographic Inequalities 
Economically speaking, Greece lacks the financial resources to process asylum 
applications for millions of people, let alone house and care for them while the paperwork is 
processed. The EU’s inability to take a common stance on the refugee crisis has left Greece in 
another difficult situation, as they struggle to meet the austerity requirements of their most recent 
2015 bailout package (McHugh, 2015). Without finances to handle the processing of asylum 
applications, more refuges slip through the cracks and enter the EU undocumented. To mitigate 
this economic inequality, resources in the form of additional Frontex workers have provided 
support to the Greek border patrol. 
When major tragedies erupt (such as the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015) 
due to undocumented movement at the edge of the Schengen zone, entry point countries become 
the scapegoat when they do not fulfill their assigned duties as ‘gatekeepers’ for the Schengen Zone 
(see Traynor, December 2015). Encouraging a geographic north-south divide on migration duties 
does little to mend the already frayed relations between Greece, the EU institutions, and other 
member states as a result of these geographic and economic inequalities – nor does it provide much 
incentive for Greece to cooperate with European asylum systems.  
The economic and geographic inequalities are not the only factors at play in regards to 
Greece’s track record of CEAS compliance, however. Given Greece’s varied history with 
migration, socioeconomic class disparity, and general ostracization10 from the EU due to the 
2007/2008 economic crisis, differences in culture can also explain some of the difficulties 
discussed in previous sections and whose impact on the regional level will be discussed in later 
sections. Regardless, the varied issues surrounding the CEAS, its construction, and 
																																																						
10 Ostracism which, ironically enough, is an ancient Athenian practice of temporarily banishing someone 
by popular vote without trial. 
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implementation have created a void which is an overarching concern for integrity of any semblance 
of an asylum process in the EU, amongst other concerns. For the safety of the at-risk populations 
entering the EU, this void should be examined further to seek out solutions that will ideally result 
in the proper processing of the asylum seekers, ensuring they are treated humanely and fairly and 
are receiving all possible resources to increase the likelihood of family reunification and 




















The previous sections discussed the Common European Asylum System and its impact on 
Greece as a result of flaws in its institutional design and Greece’s inability to implement its 
components. Three conclusion are drawn from this research:  
1. The CEAS, until 2016, was inherently geographically discriminant of periphery countries 
through the Dublin II Regulation. This regulation states that migrants crossing the 
Schengen zone irregularly must be processed for asylum in their country of entry. This 
restriction was lifted at the height of the crisis in 2016, resulting in a revised Dublin III 
Regulation. 
2. A noticeable disconnect exists between EU Institutions and Greece regarding directive and 
regulation transposition and interpretation of the CEAS. The directives and regulations set 
forth were not attainable for Greece due to financial circumstances and lack of 
infrastructure, and some were decided upon too late to implement (2014) any real change. 
This disconnect resulted in Greece being unprepared and unable to process and 
accommodate asylum seekers 
3. A large gap exists in Greece for asylum seeker assistance based on the volume of refugees. 
Greece, as described above, does not have the infrastructure, funds, or people power to 
assist 60,000 or more individuals at once or in the long term. 
For refugees, inadequate asylum policies mean: poor reception conditions and inadequate supplies 
for everyday life; a slow and sometimes expensive filing process, which, for unaccompanied 
minors and women, this often increases risk of human trafficking and a lower chance of family 
reunification; and a lack of information resources to navigate and complete the necessary 
components of the asylum process. Part II of this thesis delves into conclusion three by identifying 
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the role Greek public libraries can play in filling this information gap. Using public libraries in 
Athens as a case study, Part II discusses the role libraries often play in providing information 
resources to patrons and how this responsibility could, in theory, assist refugees with locating the 
resources they desperately need to successfully apply for and get through the asylum process. How 
procedural issues impact individuals in a local setting is a crucial component of country-wide 
systems and procedures, ideally leading to the eventual corrections of these shortcomings. 
Successful models of asylum seeker, refugee, and migrant assistance in libraries within other parts 
of Europe would assume that Greek libraries could apply the same models; however, substantial 
cultural differences, also not addressed by the CEAS, hinder their ability to utilize these models in 
a productive manner.   
 
Libraries and Their Patrons 
 
1. Books are for use. 
2. Every reader his/her book. 
3. Every book its reader. 
4. Save the time of the reader. 
5. The library is a growing organism. 
 
Eighty-six years ago, Indian librarian and mathematician Siyali Ramamrita Ranganathan (S.R. 
Ranganathan) contributed these fives laws to field of library science, detailing what he believed to 
be the underlying principles of library purpose and functionality. To this day, most librarians 
across the globe accept these laws as the foundations of their profession. As the library profession 
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has merged11 and intertwined with the information sciences in more recent years due, in part, to 
technological change, some library and information professions interchange the word ‘book’ with 
information to more accurately reflect the responsibilities of information professionals. Similarly, 
others offer a slightly larger change to these laws to better reflect the responsibilities librarians 
often face in our current social and geopolitical state. Michael Gorman (1995), well-known 
librarian and library scholar, regards Ranganathan’s laws as some of the greatest contributions to 
the field in the 20th century. Identifying the need for a more modern spin on Ranganathan’s laws, 
he offers the following laws to complement Ranganathan’s contributions: 
 
1. Libraries serve humanity. 
2. Respect all forms by which knowledge is communicated. 
3. Use technology intelligently to enhance service 
4. Protect free access to knowledge. 
5. Honor the past and create the future. 
 
Applying Ranganathan’s (coded below as R#) and Goreman’s (coded below as G#) laws to this 
research into how libraries can assist refugees, I argue the following:  
1. It is the responsibility of the librarian and/or information professional to serve patrons and 
assist with information resource dissemination, no matter the patron’s residency status, to 
assist with “the wider goals and aspirations of the culture” [G1, R1] (Goreman, 1995: 784) 
																																																						
11 I say officially because the naming of library schools has been contentious since the early 1900s, with the field 
wavering between the Library Sciences and Information Sciences. In the last ten years, library schools have adopted 
the information sciences name, which some see as the information science professionals ‘winning’. For a more 
detailed discussion on the evolution of this discussion, see Kirk, 1999 and Davis, 1987. 
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2. Information comes in many forms, including digital information regarding the laws and 
regulations of any particular country. Providing access to and assistance with such 
information is a librarian and/or information professional’s duty [G2, R2]. 
3. In times of crisis, it is the social responsibility of the librarian and/or information 
professional to provide information, sometimes without being asked. This means reaching 
out to patrons to provide programming and information that they may not know exists to 
help those in need [R3, R4]. Time is of the essence with asylum processing, in particular, 
and any effort wasted in search of information could mean serious consequences for at-risk 
populations (i.e., women and young children). 
4. The free and unfettered access to knowledge should be protected and promoted, especially 
in times of crisis and need. Clientelistic cultures and ideologies are incompatible with 
spaces of public information dissemination, as these spaces are more commonly considered 
neutral, safe places in which to gather [G4]. 
5. Given technological advances and the presence of government documents online, access 
to up-to-date technology should be obtained whenever financially possible while still 
maintaining the historical spirit of the library by-way-of rare collections and physical 
books. In the case of Greece, this is an incredibly important component of their culture and 
should not be ignored. However, the ability to utilize open access materials available on 
the internet is beneficial to all and crucial for some cases [G3, G5, R5]. 
 
The following sections discuss these arguments in the context of existing initiatives within Europe 
to assist asylum seekers and refugees and also ethnographical research into libraries within Athens, 
Greece. The unexpected findings of the ethnography underpin the above arguments, in some ways 
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offering counsel to both ensure their places in the community as leaders in open access information 
and dissemination and as safe spaces for free thinking and refuge. 
 
European Library Response to the ‘Migration Crisis’ 
 Since the mid-2000’s, a variety of public libraries in Europe have played an active role in 
assisting their communities during times of natural disasters or humanitarian crises. From Austria 
to Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, 
and the UK, their efforts tend to fall into one of two categories: efforts to assist with integration 
and/or assimilation of refugees, or efforts to assist with filing for asylum. In the Netherlands, 
librarians collected two hundred and fifty books for the AZC (An asielzoekerscentrum) refugee 
center in Almere, Flevoland, has increased “supportive activities”, and has provided all refugees 
with library cards (See European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations, 
2017). The Norwegian National Library was awarded a grant in the amount of EUR 10,000 to 
purchase more books in Arabic (See EBLIDA, 2017). Germany has developed learning materials 
to teach German through music, translating these materials into twenty-three languages (See 
EBLIDA, 2017). The Society of Chief Librarians (SCL) along with the Association of Senior 
Children’s and Education Librarians (ASCEL) in the UK have confirmed support for newly arrived 
refugees, prompting library leaders to offer the following within libraries across the UK: free 
access to computer and Wi-Fi, free access to English learning materials, free activities and 
resources for children and families, safe community space for networking and learning, counseling 
services, information for education, health, and wellness services, and trained staff to assist with 
information seeking needs (SCL, 2017). Austria has produced a variety of training materials to 
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assist librarians with programming for refugees and has additionally translated their library card 
terms and conditions into twenty different languages (See EBLIDA, 2017).  
Additionally, there is active discussion across Europe within a variety of European and/or 
international library organizations as to the role information professions can and should take to 
assist refugees and asylum seekers with familiarizing themselves with their host or new home 
country, their rights under the protection of said country, and the resources available to them as 
new community members. The European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation 
(EBLIDA), “an independent umbrella association of library, information, documentation, and 
archive associations in Europe”, actively documents many of these efforts on their website in an 
effort to connect and share these efforts for inspiration (EBLIDA, 2017). The Public Libraries 
Section within the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) has 
produced a document entitled, “Responding! Public Libraries and Refugees” in which they have 
compiled best practices and models from different countries for assisting refugees and asylum 
seekers with their information seeking needs (IFLA, 2017).  
The recognition of the role information professions can play with refugee and asylum 
seeker assistance is an important development in the field, and speaks to the possibilities and 
responsibilities of information professionals in light of technological advancement, sociopolitical 
climates, and the multicultural nature of our modern societies. While many of these examples listed 
above target refugees specifically and not necessarily asylum seekers, none of these locations are 
initial reception countries and thus are less likely to encounter displaced persons and newly arrived 
asylum seekers. However, the infrastructure exists for these countries to do so, in terms of an 
organized plan of action for newcomers to their society, trained information professions to execute 
these plans, and a financial infrastructure to support these endeavors. With these facts in mind and 
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without concrete examples of reception country initiatives, I honed in on researching the role 
information professionals in Greece play within this discussion. 
 
Library Structure in Greece 
 To better understand the results discussed in the sections below, it is helpful to have a broad 
understanding of the types of libraries within Greece. In Greece, two types of libraries exist: public 
and municipal. Public libraries “operate within a common institutional framework and are under 
the authority of and funded directly by the Greek Ministry of National Education…There are 45 
such libraries spread throughout the country” (Sitas and Moreleli-Cacouris, 2017: 1735). 
Conversely, municipal libraries belong to the municipalities that provide them funds. A 
consequence of this is lack of a common operating framework, resulting in collections and service 
disparities (2017: 1735). In the context of this thesis research, the lack of clear coordination 
automatically categorized these municipal libraries as unlikely candidates for cooperation on 
successful models of asylum seeker, refugee, and migrant assistance due to the decreased 
likelihood that they would be implemented or effective. 
In the context of municipal vs. public, the National Library of Greece is under the authority 
of the Greek Ministry of National Education, acting as the main legal depository in Greece. It 
typically publishes a nationally bibliography each year, with the last few years being the exception 
due to the financial crisis. As such, it is considered a public library. Until the Fall of 2017, the 
National Library of Greece was housed in a 19th century building in the center of Athens next to 
the University of Athens. The National Library of Greece an important library in the context of 
this study due to its original geographic location in the heart of Athens. 
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A No-Response Survey and Some Unexpected Findings  
In April of 2017, I traveled to Athens, Greece to encourage participation in an anonymous 
survey I attempted to disseminate to Greek librarians. I constructed this survey to ascertain whether 
or not asylum seekers were utilizing Greek libraries to gain assistance with the asylum process by-
way-of information resources available through public libraries. This survey (Appendix A) 
inquired as to whether or not the presence of asylum seekers (specifically) changed the functioning 
of their libraries and information services, what kind of services they requested, whether or not 
there were serious language barriers, and whether or not libraries partnered with any religious 
institutions to assist asylum seekers. I based my assumptions on resource availability in U.S. and 
European models of libraries; specifically, access to the internet and library and/or information 
professionals able to assist with website navigation and local laws. Libraries in Sweden 
(conversation based programming), Germany (mentors for refugees; language promotion kits), and 
the Caribbean, for example, have documented examples of programming for refugees and asylum 
seekers, in addition to initiatives discussed in previous sections (Briathwaite; Johnson, 2016; 
Jönsson-Lanevska, 2005; Gopalakrishnan, 2017; Detlefs and Uhlaner, 2015). Importantly, in early 
2017, the ECHO project began offering mobile libraries for refugees in northern Greece (ECHO, 
2017). While some of these services are geared more toward integration and assimilation, they 
nonetheless offer information resources toward at-risk populations. 
Assuming Athenian libraries, also at the forefront of the migration wave, would offer 
similar services, I believed my survey would yield results. Unfortunately, this was not the case and 
the survey yielded no results. I believe this due to three, possibly more, reasons: 
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1. The librarians I spoke with were uninterested in speaking about 
asylum seekers and refugees. 
2. Asylum seekers are not using the libraries in Athens. 
3. User services are not oriented in the same way in Athens; 
therefore, it was destined to fail. 
 
1. The librarians were uninterested in speaking about asylum seekers and refugees 
Since the beginning and well before the migration crisis, Greece has been suffering, 
financially. With unemployment rates cited anywhere between 35% and 60% over the last five 
years and with almost 60% of the buildings in Athens abandoned, Greek citizens are suffering 
immensely. With austerity measures passed down to Greece from European Institutions as 
conditions for their various bailout packages, some find themselves with half or sometimes 
none of their promised pension halfway through retirement. At the beginning of the financial 
crisis, others employed by the government found their yearly salary cut in half overnight. 
While in Athens for only four days, protests against the austerity measures (See Figure 3) 
Greek government (See Figure 2) and EU institutions were abundant – typically two or more 
times per day, regularly shutting down major roads within the city in and around Syntagma 












2. Asylum seekers are not using the libraries in Athens. Why? 
After speaking with Greek librarians and information professionals, I discovered 
that neither refugees nor asylum seekers were regularly utilizing library resources in 
Athens. I expected, particularly because of the reports of too few aid organizations due 
to lack of resources and fraudulent activity, that asylum seekers and/or refugees would 




Germany. I theorize their absence in these institutions to be due to one or more of the 
following reasons: 1. the libraries are not geographically close enough to detention and 
holding centers, 2. Greek librarians are not reaching out to asylum seekers and refugees 
in the same manner as other European libraries, and 3. there is a difficult culture of 
Figure 2 Grafiti in the Plaka, Photo taken April 5, 2017, Lindsay Ozburn 
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library functionality in Greece, whereby the librarian’s responsibility to its patrons is 
considered different and the individuals they consider patrons is different. Theories two 
and three are associated more closely with number three on my list of reasons the 
survey yielded no results and will be discussed more in-depth in the section below.  
Delving into theory one, I employed a visual geographic analysis to determine the 
approximate distance between public libraries in Greece, detention and holding centers, 
and also the libraries we visited while in Athens. Figure 4 shows the entirety of the 
Greece and Figure 5 a closer look into Athens. Purple pinpoints indicate public 
libraries, red pinpoints indicate detention or holding centers, and yellow pinpoints 
indicate libraries visited during the  
	
Figure 3 Protests at the (former) National Library of Greece building; Photo take April 4, 2017, Lindsay Ozburn 
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trip. As seen in Figure 4 the majority of public libraries are not geographically closer to any 
detention or holding centers, save one in the north of Greece. Figure 5 shows libraries much 
closer to detention and holding centers (roughly two miles apart); however, these libraries proved 
to either be closed to the public or more archival in nature, neither scenarios of which would be 






Figure 4 Map of Greece Pinpointing Libraries (purple) and Detention or Holding Centers (Red) 
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3. User services are not oriented the same way in Athens as in the U.S. and 
Northern/Central Europe and have different meanings. 
According to the Institute for Museum and Library Services (IMLS) public libraries 
are “established under state enabling laws or regulations to serve a community, district, 
or region, and provides at least the following: 
1. An organized collection of printed or other library materials, or a combination 
thereof; 
2. Paid staff; 
3. An established schedule in which services of the staff are available to the public; 
4. The facilities necessary to support such a collection, staff, and schedule, and 
5. Is supported in whole or in part with public funds” (Gerber, 2016). 
Figure 5 Map of Athens, Greece Pinpointing Libraries Visited (yellow) and Detention or Holding 
Centers (Red) 
 63 
By this definition, the libraries in Athens are, indeed, functioning as public libraries 
and are classified as public libraries according to the Greek Ministry of National 
Education and Law 3149. The National Library of Greece, for instance, has an 
organized collection of print materials and services seemingly available to the public, 
is supported by public funds, and recently has a new building to support their 
collections, staff, and schedule. However, the atmosphere of this library is more 
research based in nature and is thus inviting to a particular type of clientele in need of 
research materials. Academic libraries in the U.S. fit this bill much more than public 
libraries but are still, however, common spaces for community members wishing to 
utilize electronic resources. This atmosphere is potentially reminiscent of a 
phenomenon within Greece that Nikifouros Diamandouros terms ‘clientelism’ – a 
practice stemming back for decades in which people of certain ethnic groups, religions, 
political affiliations, etc. are afforded more privileges than others based on the personal 
connections one has with others (Diamandouros, 1994).  
Libraries in the U.S. and certain parts of Europe typically have a deeper, more 
engaged connection to their community and its needs than simply research services and 
collections, particularly as it relates to electronic services literacy, language and culture 
integration, and human rights advocacy (Scott, 2011). Archives and museums are 
additionally distinct from libraries in the U.S. and parts of Europe, whereby archives 
are treated as repositories and museums are dedicated to preserving and displaying 
objects important to their communities and countries. The key difference between the 
three is the way in which information is stored, how it is acquired, and how it is 
accessed. Libraries are inherently ‘customer’ facing in nature, seeking out 
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informational resources and programs that are of particular interest to its users. When 
these materials are no longer used, they are discarded or transferred to a holding facility 
such as an archive, at which point resources tend to be accessed more by researchers 
than everyday patrons. Similarly, museums collect resources of this nature and tend to 
hold more physical items that are not simply paper or books, preserving and displaying 
these materials for their community. 
 As the patrons and their needs are the defining factor for the resources these three 
institutions obtain and display, cultural differences may be at play in the case of Athens. 
In parts of Europe and especially the U.S., libraries are widely considered safe spaces 
of community gathering where knowledge is shared, exchanged, challenged, and 
created. In the case of our college town in Champaign-Urbana they are engaging, lively 
spaces with ever-changing dynamics that fluctuate with any given day, week, month, 
year, with the weather, election cycles, technological innovations, etc. Patrons study 
for exams, learn to computer code, fight for social justice, learn new languages, teach 
their children how to read, seek shelter from the elements, and welcome those who are 
new to the community and country.  
While libraries in the U.S. and many parts of Europe are actively reaching out to 
refugees and asylum seekers offering their assistance, this does not appear to be the 
case in Athens (See Briathwaite; Johnson, 2016; Jönsson-Lanevska, 2005; 
Gopalakrishnan, 2017; Detlefs and Uhlaner, 2015). By the logic described above, I 
theorize that libraries in Athens are probably not seen by their patrons as spaces such 
as just described, and therefore their libraries have no reason to become this way if their 
community does not ask for or expect it. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The migration crisis that struck Europe starting in 2015 brought to light a multitude of 
concerns in relation to the EU’s strategic plan for asylum processing, Greece’s role in protecting 
the livelihood of the at-risk populations seeking asylum, and the consequences of asylum system 
flaws on the local level as a result of geographic, economic, and cultural inequalities endemic in 
certain parts of EU law-making. The Common European Asylum System, meant to be a 
comprehensive approach to asylum processing in the EU, in addition to Greece’s improper 
implementation of its components, left Greece grossly unprepared in infrastructure to receive the 
large flow of migrants it continues to see at the end of 2017 – despite continued efforts from EU 
lawmakers to inject money into the issue.  
This thesis research is the first step in understanding the effects CEAS challenges and 
shortcomings have had on the functioning of information institutions and professions in Greece 
and what this means for the future of librarianship in Europe. The unique and unfortunate set of 
circumstances of this scenario also provide opportunity to learn about the information seeking 
needs of the at-risk populations impacted by the environment created by CEAS shortcomings and 
how to apply the lessons learned here to other instances of mobility, asylum system issues, and 
information voids.  
In Part I, this thesis completed a textual analysis and historical review of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) and national policies in Greece to better understand the impact 
and origin of the CEAS shortcomings and, with the addition of comparing asylum application data 
between 2008-2015 to directive and regulation transposition, how national policies transposed it 
as a result. Findings revealed that this policy’s shortcomings are rooted in its institutional design, 
creating CEAS formation issues; and, its failure to address diverse member state needs (cultural, 
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geographic, and economic) of this crisis, creating CEAS implementation issues. Collectively, these 
shortcomings created a void that has left more than 60,000 refugees in Greece alone without basic 
reception conditions or reliable means to apply for asylum. In large part, this environment 
embodies a lack of information resources and information professionals capable of assisting these 
asylum seekers with the paperwork and process required to apply for asylum. Across Europe, this 
void is being filled by a variety of public service and non-governmental organizations assisting 
this at-risk population throughout their entire entrance process (asylum application, refugee 
relocation, and immigrant integration/assimilation). In libraries throughout Northern and Central 
Europe (i.e., Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, the UK, and France), public libraries 
specifically are filling this void by providing a variety of programming initiatives such as 
conversation based language learning, mentor sessions, increasing vernacular language materials, 
and assisting with asylum application information when able. 
As such, part II of this thesis examined the role public libraries in Greece play in assisting 
refugees through any portion of the asylum process. As one of the largest reception countries in 
Europe, it was presumed Greece would offer similar services by utilizing their publically-funded 
libraries as safe public spaces for refugees. An electronic survey was widely disseminated to Greek 
librarians to ascertain the level of interaction they, were having with this at-risk population within 
their public libraries. However, the survey yielded zero responses, indicating one or more of the 
following: 1. The librarians were uninterested in answering questions on this topic; 2. The at-risk 
populations were not using the libraries in Greece; or 3. Greek libraries do not function in the same 
way as other European libraries. Overall, the conclusion is that these survey results in Part II point 
to major cultural differences between the member states and how they function as information 
institutions. We see here that models for refugee and asylum seeker interaction from Northern and 
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Central Europe are non-existent and are unlikely to work in Greece at the present time due to these 
cultural differences.  
A recent article published in the Encyclopedia of Library Science discusses Greek libraries 
and their claimed successes over the past twenty years (Sitas and Moreleli-Cacouris, 2017: 1735). 
Notably, the authors celebrate Greek library’s supposed accomplishment of meeting their patrons 
needs through their technological advancements and offerings. The question that must be asked is, 
who do the public librarians in Greece consider their patrons if they think they are meeting the 
patron’s information needs? If they consider their patrons only researchers or those who habitually 
use their libraries, or even those who pay taxes and are citizens, then a model for refugee and 
asylum seeker assistance will never work; which is concerning given the number of those in need 
in Greece.  
Given these cultural differences, the underlying question in regards to the CEAS is how 
Brussels can begin to adapt systems of this nature to meet the needs of member states given their 
cultural differences. In this case, Greek libraries are unable to meet the needs of refugees and 
asylum seekers at this time, regardless of the successful models in other parts of Europe, due to 
cultural differences. If Greece is unable to accommodate the directives and regulations set forth 
by the CEAS, what can be amended in the system framework to include provisions for assistance 
when the abovementioned conditions cannot be met? How can policy needs, in general, be 
translated from Greece to Brussels rather than disconnected systems and policies from Brussels to 
Greece? 
 In light of these questions, I recommend the following to be taken into consideration both 
by the EU Institutions and the citizens within: 
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• Cultural, geographic, and economic differences must be taken into account when 
formulating policy and procedures for member states. 
• Specifically, in the case of the CEAS, future revisions should identify possible outcomes 
for the individuals on the ground living through the consequences of the system and crises 
of this nature. 
• In the case of Greece and its libraries, librarians should consider more carefully their role 
as information resources within their community and how they should define their 
community when culturally appropriate and possible.  
Ideally if taken into consideration, Greece and the EU will be more prepared for any future 
scenarios of this magnitude, and perhaps this study may serve as a model to mitigate crises of a 
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APPENDIX C: RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
 
Project	Title:	
The	European	Union	Asylum	System:	The	Role	of	Greek	Public	Libraries	in	the	Midst	of	Policy		
Shortcomings	
	
Initial	recruitment	will	be	done	with	the	assistance	of	two	Greek	librarian	contacts.	They	have	
identified	several	librarians	and	library	professionals	interested	in	answering	my	questions.	I	
will	contact	these	individuals	via	email	and	will	emphasize	that,	despite	our	common	contacts,	
they	are	under	no	obligation	to	participate	in	any	interviews	and	should	only	do	so	if	they	are		
interested	in	and	freely	choose	to	do	so.	Below	is	the	script	that	demonstrates	how	I	will		
approach	the	subjects	of	my	research	and	their	potential	participation	in	it.	
	
“Hello,	my	name	is	Lindsay	Ozburn	and	I	am	a	Master’s	Student	in	European	Union	Studies	and		
Library	and	Information	Science	at	the	University	of	Illinois	in	Urbana-Champaign.	As	part	of	my	
Master’s	thesis,	I	am	interested	in	studying	the	role	you	and	your	library	play	in	assisting	asylum		
seekers	coming	through	or	to	Greece	with	their	information	seeking	needs	most	specifically	as	
it	relates	to	their	asylum	processing	needs.	If	you	are	interested	in	talking	to	me	about	your	
experiences,	I	would	like	to	interview	via	Skype	at	a	time	of	your	choosing.	Interviews	should	
last	between	30	minutes	to	one	hour.	If	you	are	unavailable	for	a	video	interview	or	
uncomfortable	with	it,	I	am	more	than	happy	to	provide	you	with	a	link	to	an	online	
questionnaire.	Please	know	that	you	are	not	obligated	in	any	way	to	participate	in	my	study	and	
if	you	choose	to	do	so,	you	will	be	provided	with	a	letter	detailing	the	interview	process,	my	
intentions	for	the	interview	results,	and	your	rights	as	a	research	participant.”	
 
